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Resumo∗ 
As contribuições de Lionel Robbins consideram a definição do escopo da 
Economia em termos da tomada de decisão condicionada à escassez e 
ainda uma preocupação metodológica com respeito à neutralidade cien-
tífica. O artigo procura situar o ponto de vista apriorístico de Robbins em ter-
mos de desenvolvimentos metodológicos posteriores, conforme a metodolo-
gia dos programas de pesquisa científicos avançada por Lakatos (1968, 
1970). O artigo busca tornar mais claro o papel do ensaio de Robbins para 
delinear o programa de pesquisa dominante em Economia e argumenta que 
a definição de Economia desse autor é central para os principais elementos 
do núcleo duro dos programas de pesquisa contemporâneos. 
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Abstract 
Lionel Robbins’ contributions consider the delineation of the scope of 
Economics in terms of decision making conditional on scarcity and yet a 
methodological concern with respect to scientific neutrality. This paper 
attempts to situate Robbins aprioristic point of view in terms of posterior 
methodological developments as given by the methodology of scientific 
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research programmes advanced by Lakatos (1968, 1970). The paper aims 
at clarifying the role of Robbins’s essay in shaping the dominant research 
programme in Economics, and contends that the author’s definition of 
Economics is central to the main elements of the hard core of contemporary 
research programmes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Reappraisal of scientific theories constitutes a central issue in the 
history of science, particularly during the last few decades. At least one 
approach stands out as specially germane to the work of an economics 
theorist as important as Lionel Robbins: the gradualist approach of the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP) first put forward by 
Lakatos.  
The essay reveals two essential issues, namely, Robbins’ delineation of 
the scope of Economics as going well beyond the assessment of the causes 
of material welfare that were embodied in previous characterizations and the 
methodological issues involved in Robbins’ position on neutrality. The 
historical path towards the essay and its initial reception are well 
documented (see, e. g., Howson (2004) and Backhouse; Medema (2009)), 
whereas the methodological status of Robbins still warrants a debate. 
Indeed, the definition of economics as being about the study of decision-      
-making conditional on scarcity has become a standard. The neoclassical 
dichotomy associated with the optimal allocation of scarce resources across 
possible alternative ends reinforces just how widespread Robbins’s definition 
did in fact become. 
The second issue, pertaining to a more methodological concern with 
respect to scientific neutrality, involved the possibility of meaningful 
separation between positive and normative statements in Economics. The 
demarcation issue has of course been subject to intense debate and 
Robbins is often associated with a strong neutrality view [see, e. g., Davis 
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(2005)) and it’s aprioristic view followed a tradition that could be traced back 
to Nassau Senior (see, e. g., Latsis (1976)). 
By focusing on methodological aspects, this paper situates Robbins’ 
aprioristic point of view in terms of posterior methodological developments. 
In particular, the MSRP advanced by Lakatos (1968, 1970) has been subject 
to adaptations in the context of Economics by Latsis (1976) and attempts to 
accommodate different degrees of apriorism, falsificationism and 
conventionalism as scientific criteria in Economics. In particular, Mongin 
(2006) has considered the possibility of a weaker form of non-neutrality, 
which is pertinent to establish the logical status of Robbins’s neutrality view 
within the context of this broader conceptual setting.  
Hence, two research questions drive this paper: the applicability of the 
MSRP in Economics in general and the place of Robbins’s seminal essay of 
1932 in particular. However, before getting to the main objective of our 
paper, certain preliminary issues must first be sorted-out. For that purpose, 
we analyse the development of the MSRP and how it relates to Economics 
per se, turning to several recent methodological developments (e. g., 
Mongin, (2006)) as well as a reconsideration of old concepts such as 
situational determinism (Nightingale, 1994).  
Focusing on the neoclassical research programme, we then proceed to 
review methodological developments by Robbins himself that are relevant to 
the earlier analysis. With these building blocks in mind, we can next evaluate 
the place of Robbins’s essay in the context of the neoclassical research 
programme. Hence, the first section explores the role of research 
programmes in Economics. The second section overviews most influential 
methodological approaches for scientific assessment with reference to 
Economics. The third section explores Robbins’s methodological 
contributions found in the Essay. The fourth section analyses the role of 
Robbins’s Essay and its historical place in the neoclassical research 
programme in Economics. The fifth and last section brings some final 
comments. 
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2 Scientific appraisal in Economics and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes 
 
2.1 General aspects 
 
Even though the MSRP is based on falsification criteria to appraise 
scientific theories, it operates quite differently in Economics that in the 
natural sciences since the assessment of falsification criteria in Economics is 
destined to be more complex. In fact, despite the growth of experimental 
Economics, one has to concede that it is often a daunting task to obtain 
testable hypotheses in the context of complex social systems.  
It is also true that distinct views on the evolution of Economics as a 
falsifiable domain can be discerned in the history of economic thought 
literature.1 In fact, if one seeks to stay within the strictures advanced by 
Canguilhem (1970), the absence of value judgments in theoretical 
construction in the social sciences would not be possible at all since the 
object of study is mutable and the choice of the associated analytical 
categories cannot be completely neutral. Indeed, the research agenda in 
Economics may in part possess historical conditioners that may themselves 
facilitate convincement strategies at a given moment.  
With the previously mentioned caveats in mind, it is relevant to consider 
how certain influential methodological developments are related to Robbins’ 
contributions. Although, Kuhn (1962) argued that the forward thrust of 
science occurred in terms of revolutions constituted by disruptive changes in 
paradigms that did not reveal completely rational behaviour on the part of 
the scientific community, Lakatos (1968, 1970) advanced a counterclaim 
concerning the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In the 
gradualist view of the MSRP, there may be progress or its converse, which 
implies a much more sophisticated falsificationism in contrast to earlier 
                                                 
1
 Arida (1996) even argues for the existence of a contrast between the american and 
european views on the progress of economic thought. In the former, knowledge would 
essentially be cumulative and evolves progressively according to a popperian 
conjecture/refutation sequence and therefore somewhat mimics the trajectory of natural 
sciences where recent theories incorporate the current temporary “truth”. The latter, in 
contrast, conceives the existence of distinct theoretical matrices that cannot trivially 
suppress each other and must, at least, co-exist at some key points. It is important to stress 
that beyond highlighting those polar cases, it is possible to detect a non-negligible content 
of rhetoric in explaining the growing dominance of a particular research framework over 
time. McCloskey (1998) also pursues similar arguments. 
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dogmatic (or naive) falsificationism.2 Moreover, the concept of a research 
programme, positioned in a middle ground between Popper’s falsificationsm 
and Kuhn’s paradigmatic shift, concerned itself with “normal science”, with 
the latter conceived primarily for the natural sciences. Experiments and 
testability were assumed as given in the developing of arguments regarding 
the research programme. Lakatos’ research programme concept is broader 
than Popper’s in the sense that it accounts for what Popper observed as 
irrational behaviour of scientists. An example of the latter would be a 
continuing insistence in working with theories where evidence shows them to 
be of limited value or even, by a Popperian definition, false. In this vein, 
Caldwell3 (1994, p. 86) traces the discussion back to the development of 
Popper’s ideas by Lakatos, showing that  
Lakatos’ positive contribution is to complete the program begun 
by Popper by proposing a methodology of scientific research 
programs that contains the best of Popper’s insights (some of 
which, incidentally, agree with ideas propounded by Kuhn and 
Feyerabend) and that enables a rational (as opposed to a 
sociological or irrational) reconstruction of methodology and of 
the growth of scientific knowledge.4  
The difficulty in empirically falsifying a theoretical hypothesis is also 
related to the so-called Duhem-Quine problem, i. e., the claim that empirical, 
testable implications incorporate several interconnected auxiliary 
hypotheses.5 In other words, one never faces isolated individual hypothesis, 
but rather a set of hypotheses, what is sometimes referred to as Quine’s 
“holistic” thesis of scientific theorizing. In Economics, for example, ceteris 
paribus assumptions are often considered and not easily disentangled from 
a string of hypotheses. Ceteris paribus is so central to many economic 
                                                 
2
 Robbins (1979) remarks that Popper should not be included in the latter category. For a 
discussion of Lakatos’ views on Popper see Lakatos (1974). 
3
 Caldwell is one of the most important authors in tracing the recent developments in the 
methodology of Economics, and his restrained methodological pluralism (instead of the 
complete relativistic pluralism of Feyerabend) and positive heuristics are relevant 
contributions. 
4
 Caldwell (1994, p. 86) continues the argument, showing the ultimate goal of Lakatos: “His 
sophisticated methodological falsificationism, then, not only lays down prescriptions by 
which science can proceed, it also provides a basis for a descriptive rational reconstruction 
of how scientific disciplines often evolve”. 
5
 Though the general arguments are often presented as a unified idea like by Lakatos, 
different authors prefer to separate the arguments by Duhem and Quine, where the latter 
would be associated with a stronger version of undetermination in science. 
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models that “[…] the requirement of ceteris paribus, despite all sorts of 
ingenious techniques, is very exacting” (Robbins, 1979, p. 999)6. 
The MSRP addresses the previously mentioned concerns through 
delineating the scope of a research program into the hard core and the 
protective belt as the essential categories. The former refers to 
assumptions of a more axiomatic nature that are not directly testable but that 
define the primitives of the framework. The latter, on other hand, 
characterize the set of auxiliary hypotheses that are prone to empirical 
falsification. This means that specific violations do not necessarily jeopardize 
the existence of the research programme. In fact, the progressive or 
degenerative nature of a research programme has to do with robustness to 
empirical refutation and the ability to explain or not new empirical facts, that 
is, to improve the empirical content/scope of the model with comparable 
robustness properties. 
Although criticisms of falsificationism abound, with many claiming a kind 
of methodological pluralism7, economists in general8 still consider 
falsificationism as the method to appraise economics research. Blaug9 
(1992, p. xiii) even contends that  
[…] modern economists do in fact subscribe to the methodology 
of falsificationism: despite some differences of opinion, 
particularly about the direct testing of fundamental assumptions, 
mainstream economists refuse to take any economic theory 
seriously if it does not venture to make definite predictions 
about economic events, and they ultimately judge economic 
theories in terms of their success in making accurate 
predictions.10 
In terms of pragmatics, it seems plausible to hold that modern Economics 
subscribes to falsificationism, some controversy still surrounds the 
applicability of MSRP into Economics. Thus, the original admonition by 
Leijonhufvud (Latsis, 1976) that, since the MSRP was created to natural 
                                                 
6
 Cross (1982) investigates Quine’s thesis, arriving at an interesting result on grouping 
hypothesis for testing in macroeconomics. Boylan and O’Gorman (2003) also revisit the 
subject of Duhem-Quine, with the goal of disputing the original thesis. Even if they do not 
match their ultimate goal, it is a work that delineates many important issues regarding 
Duhem-Quine in Economics. 
7
 See, e. g., Dow (2007), where the author argues for some form of rigour in the face of 
methodological pluralism to avoid a disinteresting relativism of the form anything goes. 
8
 The word economists here are used in the same vein as Mongin’s (2006) economist qua 
economist.  
9
 Blaug has been at times a supporter and a critic of the MSRP, and his works have been 
central to the discussion of the applicability of the MSRP in Economics. 
10
 Blaug (1992), however, shows that there is a strong difference between the discourse of 
economist regarding falsificationism and their practice.  
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sciences, a lot of caution is necessary on its transposition to Economics, is 
still valid.  
The major critiques to the applicability of the MSRP in Economics can 
be divided into three kinds11: the conceptualization of a research 
programme; the search for empirical content; and the rhetorical content of 
alternative programmes. The first point refers to the fact that it is not a trivial 
quest to define the hard core or the auxiliary belts of alternative competing 
research programmes. The second one alludes to how Lakatos emphasized 
the role of new empirical content as necessary to validate or not the 
hypothesis brought forward by the programmes. The last point has its roots 
in Kuhn’s and others’ work in which the commensurability of different 
programmes is considered a necessary condition for appraisal of scientific 
programmes. 
Although several arguments for all three critiques are advanced in this 
paper, the main point to be emphasized is that the neoclassical research 
programme is by its very nature broadly defined. Logical foundations for the 
applicability of MSRP in Economics then may be based on the same 
foundations for its applicability in natural sciences: it is based on 
sophisticated falsificationism and presupposes a ontology of Economics that 
may or may not be acceptable to the interested researcher. Lakatos’ work in 
Economics is unfashionable (Backhouse, 1998) and when used is 
accompanied of several caveats. Based on the former analysis, and 
considering the validity of some form of methodological pluralism that allows 
different valid choices, we argue that even if taking into account its 
limitations, the MSRP is a valid and impartial way to appraise scientific 
theories. It may not be the furthest a researcher could go into analysing the 
development of science, especially regarding a subject as problematic as 
Economics, but it is at the very least a concrete and sound foundation on 
which to build the appraisal of alternative economic theories. Maybe it is a 
useful starting point (Backhouse, 1998) after all, but one that should not be 
hidden behind curtains of caveats. However, we want to try arguments 
based on a unashamed view of Lakatos’ ideas, with the goal to arrive at a 
semi-rigorous definition of the neoclassical research programme on which to 
base some analytical construct useful in economic methodology, and apply it 
to Robbins’s Essay.  
Latsis (1976) illustrates MSRP in Economics with four different 
examples. The most emblematic of the MSRP in Economics is that of the 
perfect competition neoclassical research programme. In that case, the 
hard core would be characterized by hypotheses concerning profit 
maximization, independence of decisions, and complete relevant knowledge. 
                                                 
11
 Following  Blaug (1992) and Backhouse (1998). 
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Additionally, complementary assumptions regarding homogeneity of the 
product, the number of competitors and perfect mobility establish the familiar 
competitive environment. It seems clear that even when one departs from 
this benchmark, other research programmes in mainstream Economics 
share some common elements with the neoclassical hard core.  
 
2.2 The neoclassical research programme and 
situational determinism 
 
The object of analysis of the MSRP is a scientific theory. To better 
situate Robbins’ contributions in the Essay in terms of the MSRP, it is 
necessary to understand the specific programme that is consonant with 
Robbins’ work, viz., the neoclassical research programme.  
Backhouse (1998, p. 41) summarizes one of the difficulties in defining a 
research programme as to “[…] whether SRPs are to be defined on a large 
or small scale”12. We contend that both levels of analysis yield interesting 
results and are not mutually excludent. We only choose the macro scale 
because we intend to criticize some aspects of previous definitions of the 
neoclassical research programme.  
Even after choosing the scale on which the analysis is based one is not 
free from critiques (Backhouse, 1998, p. 41):  
[…] programmes may overlap, with some theories apparently 
fitting into two different programmes; different programmes may 
be related to each other; it is sometimes difficult to identify a 
hard core that is unchanged over the life of a research 
programme.  
To provide a counter argument against the two points we use the metaphor 
of the definition of sets in abstract algebra in Mathematics. Different sets are 
defined by slight changes on its properties — two different sets can have 
almost the same properties and still possess unique features. The same 
situation happens in Economics — different economic theories arise from 
slight changes in the hard core of a research programme, maybe generating 
alternative research programmes — and this happens on different scales. 
This may complicate the development of a typology of research programmes 
in Economics, but is not a major problem per se since appraising scientific 
theories imply a search for the specific features of alternative research 
programmes. The search cost may be high, and one may discard the MSRP 
on the grounds that it is unfeasible and does not yield useful content if the 
                                                 
12
 The author continues: “At one extreme we can view neoclassical economics as one SRP, 
ranged against various heterodox programmes”. 
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search cost involved is taken into account, but there is no major problem in 
using the MSRP if the proper scale is defined.  
Having defined the scale of analysis and its subject — the neoclassical 
research programme, we look into how this programme has been defined in 
the past. A central concept to the definition of the neoclassical research 
programme is situational determinism as advanced by Latsis (1972, 1976).13 
The concept of situational determinism14 states that the typical neoclassical 
agent behaves as part of a single-exit game. In that polar case the agent’s 
decision is uniquely determined by situational considerations. In contrast, in 
multiple-exit situations non-situational aspects also become relevant for 
decision-making.  
To be sure, there is no claim that psychology is involved and Latsis 
(1976) argues that single-exit problems define the neoclassical 
programme15. His famous example is that the monopolistic theory is 
methodologically no different than perfect competition models, since the 
monopolistic firm would face a single-exit game — the firm’s “choice” would 
logically have to be the one predicted by the model, with no rational 
deviation.16 Alternative research programmes in Economics would then be 
those that had multiple-exit situations. Latsis (1976) advances some 
alternative programmes in Economics, and his examples include economic 
behaviourism and organizational approaches. Later alternative programme 
propositions include the work of Lavoie (1992), who argues for a 
postclassical programme defined as a synthesis of post-keynesianism and 
neo-ricardianism. Lavoie (1992) is even more stringent when defining an 
alternative from the neoclassical programme, deriving his synthesis as one 
that abandons scarcity analysis in favour of alternative foundations.  
Machlup (1974) criticizes Latsis (1972) on many grounds, but his 
specific criticism regarding situational determinism is based on three 
arguments, what Machlup (1974, p. 276) calls confusion regarding single-     
-exit situations: the confusion between action and reaction; the confusion 
                                                 
13
 The first version of Latsis’s argument dates from 1972, but the often cited reference is 1976, 
where the author analysis situational determinism alongside the application of MSRP in 
Economics. 
14
 The concept received immediate criticism by Machlup (1974), and was revisited by 
Nightingale (1994), and Szenberg and Ramrattan (2004). 
15
 Nightingale (1994) agrees with Latsis (1976), but there is an implicit assumption in his 
agreement, that situational determinism to a great extent delineates the neoclassical theory 
of the firm. Nightingale (1994) identifies the whole neoclassical programme as the theory of 
the firm, which is a valid view since the MSRP encompasses different levels of analysis, but 
in the present paper we choose a broader definition.  
16
 Szenberg and Ramrattan (2004, p. 7) even observe that “[…] the term ‘situational 
determinism’ has evolved to represent the neoclassical program”. 
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between reactions and effects of reactions; the confusion between the 
effects of reactions of particular persons and the effects of mass reactions 
or, more correctly, of assumed typical reactions of imaginary persons. 
Although Machlup’s (1974) arguments can be emended to allow the 
possibility for maintaining situational determinism as the neoclassical 
programme, there is another argument that is even stronger: if one 
introduces any kind of probability distribution to a neoclassical model, the 
single-exit situation vanishes, since a researcher would not be able to 
identify the only course of action of the representative agent. Even more so, 
a single agent would be able to take different, mutually exclusive actions, 
and maintain the rationality necessary in neoclassical models, and such a 
model would then still be characterized by the hard core of the programme. 
A similar argument is found in Runde (1996) wherehe analyzes Popper 
in the context of probabilities, and what Popper defined as propensities, a 
prima causa of probability in social sciences. Runde (1996) argues that 
Popper’s view is incompatible with that of situational determinism, since 
(Popper, 1990, p. 17): “[…] with the introduction of propensities, the ideology 
of determinism evaporates. Past situations, whether physical or 
psychological or mixed, do not determine the future situation.”  
Game-theory would also be a source of multiple-exit situations, and 
game-theoretical models thrive in the context of uncertainty. Indeed, Runde’s 
(1996) analysis of Popper’s work has also shown how probability plays a role 
in undermining single-exit situations.17 We contend that the neoclassical 
programme envelops single-exit situational determinism; maybe all such 
situations as they happen economically. However, the neoclassical 
programme is broader than that, with an auxiliary belt that allows multiple-    
-exit situations. The hard core of the neoclassical programme would then not 
necessarily be identified with situational determinism, but decision-making 
conditional on scarcity, based on rational behaviour.  
Alternatives research programmes would have to be based on a 
different hard core than the neoclassical programme. A compelling new 
programme (certainly not the only one as the aforementioned work by Lavoie 
(1992)) is particularly interesting as well, that of complexity theory. An 
                                                 
17
 As Runde (1996, p. 478) puts it, “Of course there may be more than one action for each 
agent that follows from the ‘logic’ of his or her situation, particularly in game-theoretic 
situations in which the payoffs to any one agent of taking some course of action depend on 
the actions of other agents. Popper does not have much to say situations of this kind”. 
Although trying to specifically analyse situational determinism in the context of Popper’s 
work, Runde’s point is easily generalized to reinforce the notion that single-exit situations 
are not found in more developed models. We argue that those developed models are still 
part of the neoclassical programme, since they do not violate the hard core but bring more 
empirical content to the programme, constituting novel facts, one of the conditions for the 
applicability of the MSRP.  
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argument can be made that the study of complex adaptive systems is not a 
theory when applied to social sciences, but enough work has been done on 
these kinds of dynamical systems for complexity to warrant the moniker of 
an alternative research programme, if not a proper theory. Thus, Colander, 
Holt and Rosser (2004, p. 485) observes that  
[…] this article argues that economics is currently undergoing a 
fundamental shift in its method, away from neoclassical 
economics and into something new. Although that something 
new has not been fully developed, it is beginning to take form 
and is centered on dynamics, recursive methods and 
complexity theory.  
It is in fact not particularly difficult to describe complexity theory\and 
evolutionary Economics as an alternative research programme, since no 
main characteristic of the neoclassical research programme appears to be 
included in it. For instance, evolutionary Economics has incorporated 
Simon’s idea of satisficing instead of the usual decision making concept. 
Satisficing is a strategy where agents attempt to meet some adequate 
criteria (for instance, have to satisfy some constraint) for its decision, instead 
of identifying an optimal solution. Although some of the new terminology 
brought by complexity theory is definitely noise and could be explained 
through orthodox economics theory (see Zeidan and Fonseca (2005)), 
enough new concepts are brought that make complexity theory an 
alternative theory to neoclassical and other research programmes in 
Economics18.  
Nevertheless, we also contend that despite the existence of different 
research programmes in Economics, some relative consensus has been 
attained with respect to central elements. Latsis (1976) outlined the implicit 
positive heuristics that would indicate appealing features to be on the look-   
-out for. Apart from analytical tractability that largely justified more static 
formulations and formulations with well defined equilibrium, one faces 
aspects that relate to the rationality of agents’ decision making. In fact, Latsis 
(1976) contends that the neoclassical research programme embodies a 
rationalistic view more along the lines of a single-exit situation. Nevertheless, 
it is important to stress that the reshaping and broadening of the protective 
                                                 
18
 Nightingale (1994) applies the lakatosian framework to evolutionary Economics and arrives 
at a hard core of evolutionary Economics composed of four assumptions, including the 
differentiation of individuals in a population (no representative agent), and the obvious 
mechanism of selection.  
 See Markose (2005), for an important survey and contribution on the analysis of the 
relationship between complexity and Economics. 
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belt of the neoclassical research programme makes multiple-exit situations 
worth discussing and related issues will be further addressed in the text.19 
The next section will further discuss to what extent one can relate 
Robbins’s contributions to those methodological developments. 
 
3 Lionel Robbins: some methodological 
remarks 
 
Taking as reference modern methodological tools, one can reassess 
Robbins’s Essay to put it in the context of MSRP and other modern lines of 
research, as delineated in the previous section. With historical hindsight, the 
main transforming ideas put forward in the Essay accomplish a great deal to 
mold modern Economics.  
The classic definition by Robbins (1935, p. 16) that “Economics is the 
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses” is still the standard definition of 
the field. But the impact of his other contributions in the Essay can be 
considered more important for the shaping of modern Economics — first, the 
differentiation between positive and normative Economics, and second, the 
idea that Economics can be expressed as a system of logical deductions 
from axiomatic principles.  
The impact of Robbins’s ideas was immediate and of course much 
criticism has been aimed at his work. Three major contributions summarize 
the historical background and impact, and offer a thorough criticism of 
Robbins’s Essay — Kirzner (1975), Blaug (1992), and Caldwell (1994). In 
the realm of current economic methodology Robbins’s positivism is 
considered dead and plural methodological approaches are advocated (see, 
for instance, Dow (2004)).  
One good example of the current methodological debate is Mongin 
(2006), who analyzes the value judgment problem through economic 
evaluations, by trying to distinguish evaluative statements from actual value 
judgments. For Mongin (2006), the value neutrality problem has received 
three solutions in modern Economics, with Robbins’s position being central 
to one of them. Those three solutions are classified as strong neutrality, 
weak neutrality, and complete non-neutrality. The author dismisses the two 
polar extremes that were respectively defended by Robbins and Myrdal and 
aims at establishing a compromise in terms of a weak version of non-            
                                                 
19
 Sabooglu and Villet (1992) also criticise Latsis for the excessive identification of the 
neoclassical research program with single-exit situations.  
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-neutrality.20 The proposed fourth category defines weak non-neutrality, that 
(Mongin, 2006, p. 261)  
[…] starts with the broad claim that the question of making 
value judgments does arise for the economist qua economist, 
and that he might, might and should, or might not, make these 
judgments, depending on the case at hand. This claim clashes 
with the strong neutrality thesis and fits in with the weak 
neutrality thesis. The line is drawn with the latter by rejecting its 
containment claim. 
In any case, the main departure from strong neutrality is associated with the 
excessive simplicity involved in the dichotomy between evaluative or ethical 
predicates that embodies the usual separation between normative and 
positive analyses as motivated by Hume. 
The Essay can easily be classified as adherent to the strong neutrality 
position. The work was fundamental to the view of Economics as a “quasi-    
-hard” science, in line with the Austrian school of Economics. Robbins (1979, 
p. 999) recognizes this and reiterates: “[…] but on the positive analysis of the 
implications for behaviour of the fact of scarcity — Economics — I see no 
reason to recognize any difference between such generalizations and the 
generalizations of Physics or of Biology”. 
Although the modern discussion of methodological issues in Economics 
considers the strong neutrality position as naive21, its strength is pervasive in 
modern Economics. First of all, Robbins’s (1935) position stems from the 
original problem of the demarcation of Economics as a science, a problem 
very much unresolved then, as summarized by the author (Robbins, 1935, p. 
2):  
[…] indeed, it follows from the very nature of a science that until 
it has reached a certain stage of development, definition of its 
scope is necessarily impossible. For the unity of a science only 
shows itself in the unity of the problems it is able to solve, and 
such unity is not discovered until the interconnection of its 
explanatory principles has been established.  
This argument is hardly ever brought up when criticism of Robbins’s 
positivism arises.  
Even Robbins (1979) found it easy to defend his earlier canonical work, 
subscribing, with some clarifications, to the same position held over 45 years 
before. For instance, regarding his definition of Economics as based on 
scarcity, Robbins (1979, p. 997) expands on his earlier work by affirming 
that:  
                                                 
20
 The third category would refer to the acceptance of normative statements in very narrow 
specific contexts.  
21
 For a particularly sharp critique, see Davis (2005). 
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[…] as regards the accusation of narrowness, I suspect this 
rests on misapprehension due perhaps to undue preoccupation 
with the theory of exchange. In fact, explanation of the influence 
of scarcity extends far beyond the immediate incidence of 
catallactics: it covers questions of incentive, institutions, and 
indeed much of the legal framework of society, not to mention 
matters of indiscriminate, as well as of discriminate, benefit. 
The positivism subscribed by Robbins, in his Essay and later work, is 
based on the original demarcation problem, where his preoccupation is with 
an analysis that resonates with the work of his contemporaries, e. g., 
Austrian authors such as Mises and Hayek. Much has been written on the 
influence of Austrian authors on Robbins works22 and Robbins (1979) 
remark on cattalactics, above, is a return to a concept first developed by 
Mises, and later used also by Hayek.23 
In Mongin (2006), the position of positivism in modern Economics 
methodology is subsumed in the strong neutrality view. In this sense 
Robbins (1935) is still ingrained in mainstream economics. But Robbins 
(1935) also advances further methodological issues in his search for unifying 
principles of economics thoughts. Robbins’s apriorism is a tentative search 
for the definition of Economics as a logical system derived from basic 
principles. 
Even though the prevalence of strategic interdependence in non-ideal 
settings is largely explored with the development of Game Theory and other 
important tools in Economics, the explicit optimization assumption is 
recurring. It is important therefore to characterize Robbins’s Essay 
contributions in later delineating the central issues on MSRP in Economics. 
The aprioristic view presented in the essay is often referred as embodying a 
strong rationality assumption. Nevertheless, as indicated by Robbins (1979, 
p. 998):  
But if “rational action” means, as I think it should mean, 
consistent action, in the sense that, if one prefers A to B and B 
to C, then it is consistent to prefer A to C and inconsistent to 
prefer the contrary, I certainly do not hold that all action that is 
not vegetative must be regarded as rational in the sense that 
mutual contradictory preferences and policies on the part of 
single individuals or collection of individuals are ruled out. 
                                                 
22
 See, for instance, Kirzner (1975), or Robbins’ biography by O’Brien (1988). 
23
 Cattalactics is nowadays a footnote to the history of political economy, but is an interesting 
expression of the desire of political economists to clearly and unambiguously define their 
craft. Its definition is the Economics of market society, and Mises used it to try to define the 
scope of Economics from his more general study of human action principles (praxeaology), 
since he was dissatisfied with then current economics terminology, which he did not 
consider rigorous enough. 
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He does not necessarily champion an extreme rationality view but 
rather the prevalence of consistent constructions at the logical level and in 
therefore would be open to different configurations of the protective belt of 
the research programme. In that sense, some form of flexible apriorism as 
given by conventionalism is accommodated. In that case creativity is allowed 
and one is not hostage of a very limited set of apriori categories.24 Influential 
examples are given in terms as the “as if” approach considered by Machlup 
(1955) or most notably the instrumentalism defended by Friedman (1953) 
that emphasizes predictive power of the theoretical construct rather than 
realism. Examples of unrealistic frameworks proliferate in Economics as for 
example the Real Business Cycle research that emphasizes the role of 
technological shocks in explaining economic activity fluctuations. The lack of 
closed analytical closed form solutions for those dynamic general equilibrium 
models were later made feasible by the use of calibration methods that 
became widespread in macroeconomics. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing 
that neoclassical microeconomic theory should not be identified with the 
simple textbook model of perfect competition. In fact, informational 
constraints may require sophisticated optimizing agents but more realistic 
settings are becoming part of the mainstream as indicated, for example, by 
the fast diffusion of asymmetric information models in contract theory (see, 
e. g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). 
At any rate, however, even when computational improvements provide 
an additional capacity for refutation (or rather generic consistency), it is 
important to emphasize that the route towards a progressive scientific 
research programme in Economics is likely to be less smooth than in the 
natural sciences and diverge from a conjecture/refutation path, since it is 
more difficult to generate testable empirical hypothesis in economics than in 
natural sciences. Indeed, that should be the case even when it is not a 
matter of theory being ahead of measurement.  
 
4 Lionel Robbins and research programmes 
in Economics 
 
The argument for the usefulness of the MSRP as a tool to explain the 
development of Economics was advanced in the first section. Robbins 
(1979) is an important contribution to the debate regarding Robbins (1935) 
                                                 
24
 Mongin (2007) provides a detailed discussion of apriorism considering, in particular, 
comparisons between Robbins and Von Mises. The terminology adopted here of “flexible 
apriorism” is similar to the “weak apriorism” (apriorsm faible) suggested by that author. 
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and its links with the work on MRSP being advanced by Latsis (1976). It is 
worth mentioning that Robbins (1979) is sympathetic to the MSRP approach, 
but with some caveats, especially regarding the possibilities of accruing true 
generality with MSRP. In the next section, we follow that direction and 
attempt to articulate Robbins’ contributions when one regards Economics in 
terms of the MRSP. 
Where does Robbins’s essay rank if one is to analyze the evolution of 
Economics through the prism of MSRP? To answer this research question, 
which is the ultimate goal of the paper, we first take the neoclassical 
programme as a benchmark.  
The neoclassical research programme and other mainstream research 
programmes are often criticized for their static character and reliance on a 
strong informational assumption. It is important to stress, however, that at 
least with respect to this claim the scope of neoclassical Economics has 
greatly expanded to encompass different forms of asymmetric information. 
There are in fact progressive research programmes in mainstream 
Economics and even anomalies detected in the realm of Economic 
Psychology which have not imposed serious wounds in what concerns the 
hard core of mainstream research programmes. One example is the issue of 
self-control and conflicts between short-run and long-run that are addressed 
with hyperbolic discounting in contrast with exponential discounting without, 
nevertheless, abandoning an optimization approach.  
We propose that Robbins’s definition of Economics in terms of    
decision-making conditional on scarcity and the associated optimal allocation 
of resources highlights the essential element of the hard core of research 
programmes in Economics, namely, that objective functions and constraints 
as defining an optimization problem characterizes economic analysis. This 
does not mean that those elements remain as simple as in initial 
neoclassical formulations. In fact, the protective belt is gradually reshaping 
itself, but the essential optimization notion remains central in the hard core of 
mainstream research programmes, and the explicit consideration of it in the 
delineation of Economics presented in the Essay is important.   
The modern neoclassical research programme may or may not still be 
classified as progressive since many research questions are still open and 
many models are still being carried out in the grand tradition of this research 
programme. The hard core is mostly constant, as would be expected, and 
the nature of the programme, its definition as progressive, depends on the 
formulation and research being done in the auxiliary belt axis. Heterodox 
theory, of course, assumes that the neoclassical model does not hold. 
Appraisal of current alternatives research programmes is unusual, since 
philosophy of science is regarded as a historical discipline — one major 
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issue is the identification problem, i. e., it is very difficult to rigorously account 
for alternative research programmes while they are developing. 
Contemporary Economics presents an interesting case, however, where 
complexity theory is clearly an alternative research programme to all other 
programmes in Economics, be it orthodox or heterodox, since the hard core 
of the complexity theory research programme is almost completely (but not 
completely) incongruent with mainstream economic research programmes.  
An alternative to Robbins’ (1935) famous definition is given by him in 
the same essay (Robbins, 1935, p. 83): “In pure Economics we examine the 
implication of the existence of scarce means with alternative uses. As we 
have seen, the assumption of relative valuations is the foundation of all 
subsequent complications”. That the points raised above are in the center of 
the neoclassical research programme is hardly controversial. Coupling that 
with the strong neutrality position expressed in the rest of the work, we 
contend that Robbins’s Essay is one of the central pieces of the neoclassical 
research programme. We argue that situational determinism, although not 
incongruent with Robbins’ decision-making conditional on scarcity, presents 
more problems to the definition of the neoclassical research programme than 
Robbins’ and others authors’ contributions. A straightforward axiomatic set 
with decision-making under scarcity as one of the axioms would better 
characterize the neoclassical research programme25.  
The neoclassical research programme has an in-built strong aversion to 
value judgments, for better or worse. Monguin’s (2006) version of the weak- 
-non neutrality, as plausible and interesting as it is, is clearly incongruent 
with the praxis of Neoclassical Economics. Models that strive for pure 
impartiality are the norm in modern micro- and even macroeconomics, and 
are judged, in theory, by falsificationism, while value judgments as observed 
by Monguin (2006) are strange to its core. In this sense, a epistemology of 
science that incorporates Monguin’s concept of weak non-neutrality would 
certainly be an alternative to the neoclassical research programme.  
Not every argument, however, found in the Essay has permeated the 
neoclassical research programme. Robbins’ distrust of empirical studies is 
expressed when he argued against the incautious use of empirical studies 
(Robbins, 1935, p. 107):  
[…] we are here entering upon a field of investigation where 
there is no reason to suppose that uniformities are to be 
discovered. The "causes" which bring it about that the ultimate 
valuations prevailing at any moment are what they are, are 
heterogeneous in nature: there is no ground for supposing that 
                                                 
25
 Although an interesting and maybe herculeous research question in itself, a complete hard 
core definition of the neoclassical research programme is not the goal of this paper. Here 
we merely argue that points raised in the essay are part of it.  
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the resultant effects should exhibit significant uniformity over 
time and space.  
The same argument is echoed in Robbins (1979, p. 1003): “[…] in my 
judgment current appreciation of the real value of economic science has 
been too much influenced by excessive focus on its power to predict to the 
neglect of its wider power to explain”. Although an interesting argument, it is 
a battle that Robbins’s ultimately lost since prediction models that use real 
data are currently widespread in all areas of Economics, be they 
neoclassical or not. 
 
5 Final comments 
 
The paper aimed at assessing Lionel Robbins’s impacts on 
methodological developments that were later advanced to appraise scientific 
method in Economics. For that purpose we revisited important issues in 
economics methodology. In particular, we discussed the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes as advanced by Lakatos (1968, 1970) and 
further discussed by Latsis (1976).  
We tried to highlight the limitations of the MSRP utilisation in 
Economics, but also how it can lead to some interesting insights, especially 
since economists still regard themselves as practitioners of falsificationism in 
their craft. Recent developments in the methodology of Economics lead to 
possible increased interest in the applicability of MSRP in Economics since 
we showed that some arguments show promise in dealing with the 
limitations of the applicability of the MSRP into Economics. Using these 
arguments as a logical foundation, we then proceeded to use the MSRP to 
assess Robbins’s Essay. We emphasized the role of situational determinism 
as the definition of the neoclassical research programme and concluded that 
the concept is insufficient to broadly define this particular programme.  
We contend that Robbins’s dichotomy between scarce resources and 
pressing necessities that require optimal allocations define optimization as a 
central element in the hard core of different research programmes, in special 
the neoclassical research programme. We also argue that this definition, 
alongside the aprioristic view — now regarded as strong neutrality — found 
in the Essay is central to the neoclassical research programme. 
In summary, we concur about the seminal character of Robbins’s Essay 
in explicitly setting the basis of the neoclassical research programme. Even 
though the programme might have not attained the stability it strived for and 
has maybe entered its degenerative phase, the notion of optimization 
remains central to it.  
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An issue that deserves further investigation refers to the reconfiguration 
of the protective belt of the neoclassical research programme to assess if the 
programme has entered its degenerative phase. In fact, the particular new 
forms of optimization problems that arise as new research questions merit 
further discussion. However, those considerations extrapolate Robbins’s 
more general considerations that characterise the essential elements of the 
hard core of the neoclassical research programme. 
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